Firm Foundation

Once in a while a case comes along that illustrates the proper meaning of the often misunderstood and over-used phrase “separation of church and state.” Parish of St. Paul’s Episcopal Church v. The Episcopal Diocese of Connecticut Donations and Bequests for Church Purposes, Inc., is just such a case.

There is a notion in some liberal circles that an organization like the Foundation for Moral Law does not believe in the separation of church and state. Sometimes when these people read our criticisms of the so-called “wall” of separation between church and state they think we are advocating for a theocracy. However, in reality nothing could be further from the truth. The Foundation believes strongly in the institutional separation of church and state and considers it to be a principle essential both to the strength of churches and the nation’s governing system.

This last statement may cause alarm for some Christians who have heard it said or are fond of saying themselves that the separation of church and state is not in the United States Constitution and, therefore, it is unconstitutional. While it is technically true that the words “separation of church and state” are not found anywhere in the Constitution or the First Amendment thereto, the concept of institutional separation of church and state certainly is embedded within the confines of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.

The factual background of the illustrative case of Parish of St. Paul’s Episcopal Church unfortunately involves the continued retreat of the Episcopal Church from Biblical standards on some social issues. In this case, six Episcopal churches and their priests no longer wanted to be under the oversight of Bishop Andrew D. Smith, the leader of the Episcopal Diocese of Connecticut, because Bishop Smith voted in 2003 in favor of openly gay Bishop V. Gene Robinson of New Hampshire. The churches instead wanted “delegated pastoral oversight” from a more conservative bishop, an arrangement that Bishop Smith refused to approve. Bishop Smith then brought ecclesiastical charges against the priests and their churches for allegedly “abandoning the communion of the church.” They were convicted and as a result new priests were appointed to each parish by Bishop Smith. Bishop Smith also seized control of one of the six churches after removing its priest from his position and from the priesthood.

The lawsuit filed by the six churches and their priests alleged that Bishop Smith violated the civil and property rights of the priests and the churches they lead. However, federal district judge Janet Bond Arterton concluded that the court had no jurisdiction to hear these claims because the dispute was a matter settled by church law and the government had no business meddling in the church’s internal governing affairs. As Arterton explained:

“[T]he plaintiff parishes are subject to the governance of the Diocese and ECUSA on matters of church doctrine and the ownership of church/parish property. . . . It is the internal policies and procedures of the church, not the statutes, that plaintiffs actually challenge. Whether Bishop Smith acted contrary to or outside of the Diocese’s own rules is a question of canon law, not a question of the constitutionality of the challenged Connecticut statutes.”

While these six churches and their priests should be applauded for standing on Biblical principles concerning homosexuality, and it is easy to be sympathetic toward their plight, the legal result reached by Judge Arterton is exactly right because of the principle of institutional separation of church and state. Judge Moore wrote an opinion while he was Chief Justice of Alabama on a case involving a church dispute that exhaustively explained why this is so. In Yates v. El Bethel Primitive Baptist Church, then-Chief Justice More stated, in part:

“The church—as an institution—does not have authority over the affairs of civil government, and the state—as an institution—does not have authority over the affairs of church government because the state has concern for the things of this world while the church has concern for the soul of man in the next. Although civil government has the authority to enforce its laws with physical punishment and/or a monetary fine, a church cannot enforce criminal sanctions. Acknowledgment of this separation comes from a recognition that God is the source of all power.” Yates, 847 So. 2d 331, 355 (2002).

That the institutions of church and state should remain separate is the very reason that the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” “Establishment[s] of religion” involve the church as an institution. A Congressional report discussing it in 1854 elaborated on the point:

“What is an establishment of religion? It must have a creed, defining what a man must believe; it must have rites and ordinances which believers must observe; it must have ministers of defined qualifications, to teach the doctrines and administer the rites; it must have tests for the submissive, and penalties for the non-conformist. There never was an established religion without all these.” House Report No. No. 33-124 (1854).

This separation is for the benefit of both the church and the state. The Yates opinion explains:

“On the one hand, this separation protects the state’s sphere of authority from intrusion by the church because religious institutions cannot enact civil laws or execute or interpret civil laws to bind the citizenry. On the other hand, this separation protects the church’s sphere of authority from encroachment by the civil government because the state cannot dictate one’s form of worship or one’s articles of faith.” Yates, 847 So. 2d at 356.

As important as this separation is, it is equally important to realize what separation of church and state does not mean.

“[I]t is only the ‘institutions’ of church and state that must be separate and independent from one another. Individuals serving in civil government obviously can participate in the church, and people who participate in the church are not prohibited from participating in civil government. In fact, they may do so without leaving their religious beliefs at the door. Separation of church and state does not mean separation from our public life of the acknowledgment of God.” Yates, 847 So. 2d at 356.

The bottom line is that the institutional separation of church and state is a vitally important, constitutionally mandated, and Biblically grounded principle that courts must adhere to if we are to maintain our religious freedom. The Parish of St. Paul’s Episcopal Church case continues this tradition. But care must be taken not to extend the principle beyond its boundaries and to apply a hyper-sensitive version of church-state separation in society; otherwise, religion will be stripped from the public sphere altogether. It is such misapplications of the principle that produce absurd rulings like “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance being declared unconstitutional and Nativity scenes being removed from public settings during Christmas time.

While the church certainly can survive with such a “wall of separation” in place because it does not need government in order to thrive, the state is not so independently strong. As John Adams once noted, “Religion and Virtue are the only Foundations, not only of Republicanism and of all free Government, but of social felicity under all Governments in all Combinations of human Society.” Thus, it is a grave error to misunderstand the true meaning of the separation of church and state because the very survival of the nation depends upon maintaining a religious foundation which is the bedrock of morality without violating the freedom of conscience endowed to us by God.